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NOTES
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

PROPOSED RuLEs ON NOTICE OF ALIBI,
DEPOSITIONS, AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

The committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States has submitted to the bench and bar of the country for consideration and suggestion drafts of certain amendments to the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure.' From proposals of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
which include the addition of two new criminal rules and changes in twenty-six
existing rules, the scope of this note has been restricted to a discussion of Rules
12A and 17A (new), and the amended Rule 15. These rules are largely refinements of pre-trial procedure, each tending to eliminate an "element!' in the defendant's case. Rule 12A requires the defendant to give notice to the prosecution
of his intention to present an alibi defense; Rule 15 allows the prosecution to take
and use depositions for the same reasons as the defense; and Rule 17A authorizes
general pre-trial procedure.
These rules might indicate that the tenor of the proposed amendments is
that of the oft quoted "Garsson outlook" that, "our dangers do not lie in too
little tenderness to the accused. . . . What we need fear is the archaic formalism2
and watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime."
However, the antithetic philosophy that "both doctrinally and practically, criminal

procedure as presently constituted does not give the accused every advantage but,
instead, gives overwhelming advantage to the prosecution "' seems to be the underlying philosophy of various other amendments. The Committee apparently
was striving for an objective balance. Fundamental to the conflict of policy there
remains the perplexing question: How far can and should even a "balanced
refinement" of the judicial process go in the elimination of defendant rights?
I. NOTICE

OF ALIBI:

RuLE 12A

Background. - By an act of 1908, Scotland became the first common law
jurisdiction to enact a law requiring notice of alibi.4 Introduced in the United
States only two years later by Wigmore,5 it was not until the early 1920's when
Professor Millar's lectures and articles" spotlighted the advantages of the rule that
it gained attention in this country. In 1927 Michigan became the first state to
7
adopt the "alibi rule" by statute and was followed two years later by Ohio. By

1941, Iowa became the last of 14 states8 which presently, by statute or rule of
court, require that the defendant who intends to present an alibi defense give pre-

trial notice and particulars to the district attorney in conformity with the rule.
For several years attorneys general recommended that federal procedure re1 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Press Release, Jan. 10, 1963.
2 United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
3

Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,

5
6

WIGMORE, POCKET CODE OF EVIDENCE, § 1331 (1st ed. 1910).
Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. Cium. L. & C. 344, 350

7

See Dean, Advance Specifications of Defense in Criminal Cases, 20 A.B.A.J. 435

69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1152 (1960).
4 Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, C. 65 § 35.

(1920), and again in his address at Cincinnati before the American Institute of Criminal
Law and Criminology; Millar, The Function of Criminal Pleading, 12 J. CIam. L. & C. 500
(1921).
(1934).

8 Aiz. Ceib. PRoc. RULES 192 (1956); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1631-9-1633 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1949); MicH. Comp.
LAws §§ 768.20, .21(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1957); N.J. RULES 3:5-9 (1953);
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 295-1; OHro Rav. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (Page 1954); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 585 (1937); S. D. CODE § 34.2801 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-

22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561, 6562 (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.07
.1
(1958).
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quire such a rule.9 A rule similar to Rule 12A now under consideration was proposed in the 1943 and 1944 preliminary drafts of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 0 but was never incorporated in the adopted rules.
The present proposed rule,1 while more concisely stated, is basically the same rule
that was rejected in 1946. After a demand to serve notice is initiated by the prosecution the defendant must, within five days after the demand, file notice of alibi stating
the place where the defendant claims to have been at the time stated in the demand.
The defendant is not required as in seven of the other states' 2 to list witnesses, but the
notice must be in writing. Like most of the alibi statutes, failure to comply with these
requirements may result in exclusion of alibi testimony of persons other than
the defendant. Patterning other alibi statutes which either by express provision or
construction' 3 place the exclusion of alibi evidence within the discretion of the
trial judge, the harshness of strict exclusion in 12A is ameliorated by the conclusion, "unless the court for cause shown orders otherwise."
Purpose of Rule 12A. - Although the common law required no alibi notice,
modern conditions have manifested, or perhaps merely dramatized, frequent abuses
by counsel in manufacturing testimony.' 4 The perjured alibi defense has been
said to be "one of the main avenues of escape of the guilty."' 5 Often "reasonable
doubt" has been thrown upon state witnesses by the conflicting testimony of defense witnesses, whisked, a la Perry Mason, into the courtroom at the last minute
affording the state little or no opportunity to check either the credibility or accuracy of the witness' statement. It is practically impossible for the state to expose such fabrications without benefit of investigation and sufficient time to prepare a rebuttal. In most cases the accused would not offer perjured alibi testimony
with knowledge that the prosecution will have ample time to investigate its
veracity.
The proponents of this rule contend that it will also work in favor of the
innocent defendant. For in many cases an investigation of the alibi and subsequent determination by the prosecution of the truthfulness of said alibi will result in
9 See Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States (Cummings) (1933)
1, (1936) 2, (1937) 11, (1938) 9; id.(Murphy) (1939) 7.
10 FED. R. CRim. P., Preliminary Draft 88-97 (1943); FED. R. CRIm. P., Second Preliminary Draft 80-89 (1944).
11 Proposed Rule 12A reads as follows:
No less than ten days before the date set for trial, the attorney for the
government may serve upon the defendant or his attorney a demand that
the defendant serve a notice of alibi if the defendant intends to rely on
such defense at the trial. The demand shall state the time and place that
the attorney for the government proposes to establish at the trial as the
time and place where the defendant participated in or committed the
crime. If such a demand has been served the defendant, if he intends
to rely on the defense of alibi, shall not more than five days after service
of such demand, serve upon the attorney for the government and file a
notice of alibi which states the place where the defendant claims to have
been at the time stated in the demand. If the defendant fails to serve
and file a notice of alibi after service of a demand, he shall not be permitted to introduce evidence at the trial tending to show the defense of
alibi other than his own testimony, unless the court for cause shown
orders otherwise.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CRIMINAL
[Hereinafter cited as
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 5-6 (1962)

1962 Proposed Amendments].
12 ARiz. CRIM. PROC. RULES 192 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1950); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1949); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.20 (1948); N.J. RULES
3: 5-9 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 295-1; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1958).
13 CAL. LAW. REV. COMM., RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO NOTICE OF
ALIBI IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS 11 (1960).
14 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1855b (3d ed. 1940).
15 Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. CRIM. L. & C. 344, 350
(1920).
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a dismissal of the charges before trial.1 6 What will be sufficient to dissuade the
prosecution, however, is at best debatable and under no circumstances does this
rule appear to be defense-orientated.
Constitutional problems. - While there are no federal decisions on the constitutionality of state alibi statutes, state courts have generally held them constitutional under the Federal Constitution." A federal alibi statute, however, must
face more than the "due process" attack. The objection has been made that the
rule violates the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. However, in People
v. Shade,' it was held that compelling the defendant to yield particular information to the district attorney in order to be eligible to use an alibi defense does
not violate the privilege. As recently as 1962 the California Supreme Court in
Jones v. Superior Court 9 quoted Professor Dean's comments as follows:
Mhe alibi statutes do not infringe on the privilege of self-incrimination.
Rather, they set up a wholly reasonable rule of pleading which in no
manner compels a defendant to give any evidence other than that which
he will voluntarily and without compulsion give at trial. Such statutes
do not violate the right of a defendant to be forever silent. Rather they
say to the accused: If you don't intend to remain silent, if you expect
to offer an alibi defense, then advance notice and whereabouts must be
forthcoming, but if you personally and your potential witnesses elect to
remain silent throughout the trial, we have no desire to break that silence
by any requirement of the statute.

There seems to be little reason to believe that such statutes violate the privilege
against self-incrimination. The decision to use or not to use an alibi defense is
a voluntary determination. The information sought concerns matters which the
20
defendant says will exonerate him; and thus, he is not testifying against himself.
The Shade opinion that no innocent person could be injured by such a statute2 '
seems to be a fair evaluation.
A perplexing question is whether the accused has the constitutional right
to surprise the prosecution. 2 No case has been found where such a proposition
has been advanced. If a trial is a search for truth and not merely a tournament
of technique, it hardly seems that this limitation can be a deprivation of fair
trial.
Another constitutional question is whether the accused's right to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment entitles him to the appearance of any
witness he desires to question without prior notice to the prosecution. Such an
argument was successful in limiting the scope of a Washington statute similar
to the alibi statute 2 but it would seem the rights to compulsory process are not
unlimited in scope. For example, geographical restrictions on the right of an indigent to compel the attendance of witnesses without cost before the advent of
24
the Federal Rules, were never held to be unconstitutional on these grounds.
The placing of 12A within the discretion of the court obviates many constitutional infirmities since the courts would still be free to admit testimony or set
aside a conviction where the inclusion of alibi testimony would deprive the accused of a fair trial.
Other problems. Various problems have already been faced on a state
level. It is generally held that compliance with provisions of the alibi statute
is a prerequlsite to the admissibility of the testimony of an alibi witness. 25 Where

16 Op. cit. supra note 13 at 9.
17 E.g., State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931).
18 161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y. Supp. 612 (Queens. County Ct. 1936).
19 22 Cal. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 922 (1962) citing Dean, Advance Specification of Defense in Criminal Cases, 20 A.B.A.J. 435, 440 (1934).
20 People v. Shade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y. Supp. 612, 615 (1936).
21 Id. at 619.
22 Op. cit. supra note 13, at 15.
23 State v. Martin, 165 Wash. 180, 4 P.2d 880 (1931).
24 FED. R. CIuM. P. 17(b).
25 E.g., State v. Parker, 166 Kan. 707, 204 P.2d 584 (1949).
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the defendant
gave only oral notice, 26 or abandoned one alibi and tried to substitute
28
27
another,

or attempted to introduce a time card where alibi notice was not given,

the court refused admission of the evidence. One problem dealt with in some
states, viz., whether the defendant should be allowed to give his own testimony
as to his alibi without giving notice, 29 is resolved by the exclusion of the defendant's testimony from the notice requirement of Rule 12A. While none of the
state statutes make this distinction, there is little reason to include the defendant's
testimony, since the prime purpose of the statute is the elimination of the parade
of alibi witnesses at the close of the trial and the value of the accused's uncorroborated alibi would be negligible.
In interpretating alibi statutes, state courts have held that these statutes do
not shift the burden of proof to the defense. 0 It was also ascertained that under
no conceivable theory should a document alleging the intention to use an alibi
defense be presented to the jury, when in fact, there has been no evidence of
alibi, since such could not do other than prejudice the jury.31
Critique. - A survey conducted in 1940 on the practicality of state alibi statutes
revealed that they have been of questionable utility.3 2 There appears to be general

indifference to the alibi rule. 33 In fact, one prosecutor reports that the statute
is seldom invoked because it is of little effect in overcoming a well-presented alibi
defense. 4 There is also the possibility of indirect disadvaitage to the prosecution;
a skillful defense lawyer will undoubtedly highlight in summation that this alibi
was unshaken, unrebutted - in spite of the fact that the state knew of the testimony long in advance of the trial. Furthermore, a substantial number of prosecutors polled felt that the common law practice is not unjust to the state.35
The California Law Revision Commission, after careful study, recommended
that a well-drawn and wisely applied alibi statute will be a useful tool in the
prosecution of criminals, but (contrary to Professor Millar's opinion) 3 such would
be of little value without provision for the disclosure of names of witnesses. 37 One
certainly cannot overlook the opposition such an extension would create, but in
order to be worthwhile an alibi rule must be effective. Merely designating the
"place" will be of minimal value to the prosecutor attempting to test the credibility of the alibi. It also appears that, since the prosecution has deprived the
defense of an element of surprise, there should be provisions made for reciprocity.
A list of witnesses the prosecution intends to rely upon to establish the defendant's
presence at the scene of the crime might be required. Since the invoking of the
alibi procedure is discretionary with the prosecution, he might well forego his
privilege if such disclosure by the defense is not worth the information he must
disclose in return. Such a provision, while limiting the alibi rule as a weapon of
the prosecution, goes far to encourage the quest for truth. It also protects the
defendant's rights by maintaining the delicate balance of power between the
prosecution and the defense.
26 Balzhiser v. State, 35 Ohio L.R. 120, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 666. (App. 1931).
27 State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495 (1952).
28 People v. Longaria, 333 Mich. 696, 53 N.W.2d 685 (1952).
29 People v. Rakiec, 289 N.Y. 306, 45 N.E.2d 812 (1942).
30 State v. Whitely, 100 Utah 14, 110 P.2d 337 (1941).
31 State v. Cocco, 73 Ohio App. 182, 55 N.E.2d 430 (1943).
32 Stayton & Watkins, Is Specific Notice of the Defense of Alibi Desirable? 18 TEXAs
L. REv. 151 (1940).
33 Id. at 158.
34 Worgan & Paulsen, The Position of a Prosecutor in a Criminal Case - A Conversation
with a Prosecuting Attorney, 7 PRAc. LAW. 44, 57 (Nov. 1961).
35 Stayton & Watkins, supra note 37 at 157.
36 Millar, The Statutory Notice of Alibi, 24 J. QuM. L. & C. 849, 859 (1934).
37
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II.

Background. -

DEPosrrIoNS: AMENDMENTS To RULE 15

The previous history of defendants prosecuted and convicted

upon ex parte depositions taken in the absence of them and their counsel caused

widespread doubt as to the propriety of depositions taken by the prosecution. This
resulted in general legislative omission in providing for such authority.,
Chief
Justice Taft expressed the need for a new rule as early as 1905 when he observed:
Another principle of the law of evidence embodied in the constitutional
limitations is that the defendant must be confronted with the witnesses
who testify against him. This seems to impose unnecessary hardships upon
the government, because it certainly would not injure the defendant if
depositions were taken and the defendant or his counsel were permitted
to cross-examine. 39

A remedy was effected in some states by statute and presently some twentytwo jurisdictions 0 permit depositions to be taken by the prosecution, some with
limitations as to classes of cases, or with requirements of consent by the defendant.
Both in the preliminary and second drafts to the original Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provisions were made for the taking of depositions by the
prosecution; measures for the protection of the defendant's rights were therein
included. 4 1 The present amendments to Rule 1542 do not differ materially from

the deleted provisions of the 1943-1944 proposals. They permit the government to
take depositions for the same reasons as the defendant, with a subsection for
protecting the defendant's right to be present at the taking of the deposition and
provision for paying the expenses of the defendant and his counsel when the deposition is taken at the instance of the government or a witness.
Constitutional Problems. - In almost every state constitution recognition has
been given to the right of confrontation by clauses requiring that in criminal cases
the accused shall be "confronted with the witness against him" or "brought face
to face" with him. 4 s However, with the exception of certain Texas decisions"
38

5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1398 (3d ed. 1940).
39 Taft, The Administration of the Criminal Law, 15 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1905).
40 5 WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1398, note 6 (3d ed. 1940); Mo. SuP. CT. RULE 25.13.
41 FED. R. GRIM. P., Preliminary Draft 98-102 (1943); FED. R. CnmA. P., Second Preliminary Draft 90-94 (1944).
42 Proposed amendments to Rule 15 read as follows:
(a) When Taken. If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable
to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that his testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order
to prevent a failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of
an indictment or information may upon motion and notice to the
parties order that his testimony be taken by deposition and that any
designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, not privileged,
be produced at the same time and place. If a witness is committed for
failure to give bail to appear to testify at a trial or hearing, the court on
written motion of the witness and upon notice to the parties may direct
that his deposition be taken. After the deposition has been subscribed
the court may discharge the witness.
(g) At Instance of the Government or Witness. The following additional
requirements shall apply if the deposition is taken at the instance of the
government or a witness. The officer having custody of a defendant shall
be notified of the time and place set for the examination, and shall produce him at the examination and keep him in the presence of the witness during the examination. A defendant not in custody shall be given
notice and shall have the right to be present at the examination. The
government shall pay to the defendant's attorney and to a defendant not
in custody expenses of travel and subsistence for attendance at the examination.
1962 Proposed Amendments 6-7.
43 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (3d ed. 1940) (note 1 lists the constitutional provisions of all the states.).
44 Kemper v. State, 63 Tex. 'Grim. 1, 138 S.W. 1025 (1911). Cline v. State, 36 Tex.
Grim. 320, 36 S.W. 1099 (1896); contra Robertson v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 216, 142 S.W. 533
(1912).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
no case was found in which a statute authorizing the taking of depositions against
the accused person has been held unconstitutional. But several state courts have
used language indicating that they
would regard such statutes as inconsistent with
45
the right to confront witnesses.
There existed at common law the right to read a deposition in court if such
deposition had been taken in the presence of the defendant and the defendant's
counsel had the right to cross-examine. 6 This right was contingent upon proving
to the satisfaction of the court that the witness at the time of the trial was dead,
insane, or too ill, to be expected to attend the trial; or, he was kept away by the
connivance of the defendant."' In West v. Louisiana, s the Supreme Court extended the common law rule to admit the deposition of a witness who was permanently beyond the jurisdiction of the state. Such an extension was held not to
deprive the defendant of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court avoided the question of violation of the Sixth Amendment by stating that that
amendment does not apply to state courts. Rule 15, as amended however, would
have to meet this contention head on.
A definitive statement by the Supreme Court on the extent and guarantee
of confrontation appears in Mattox v. U.S.:49
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question, was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted
in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has the
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience
of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury

in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief. There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused
should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death
of the witness; and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be
read, he is deprived of that advantage of that personal preference of the

witness before the jury which the law had designed for his protection.

But, general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and the necessities of the case ....
The law in its wis-

dom declares the rights of the public shall not. be wholly sacrificed in
order that the incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.
Thus, confrontation has two purposes: to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination, and the secondary advantage of "demeanor evidence." There is no -denial that demeanor evidence is of great value to the accused
and should be insisted upon whenever it can be had.
The witness present, the promptness and unpremeditatedness of his answers or the reverse, their distinctness and particularity on the want of
these essentials, their incorrectness in generals or particulars, their directness or evasiveness, are soon detected ....

The appearance and man-

ner, the voice, the gestures, the readiness and promptness of the answers,
the evasions, the reluctance, the silence, the contumacious silence, the contradiction, the explanations, the intelligence or want of intelligence of
the witness, the passions which move or control fear, love, hate, envy or0
revenge - are all open to observation, noted and weighed by the jury.

But, common law never recognized any right to an indispensable thing called
confrontation differentiated from the right of cross-examination. s5 This secondary
advantage does not arise from the confrontation of the opponent and the witness.
The witness' presence before the tribunal, which secures this secondary advantage,
45 E.g., Kaelin v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 354, 1 S.W. 594 (Ct. App. 1886); State v.
Chambers, 44 La. Ann. 603, 10 So. 886 (1892).
46 5 WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 1398 (3d ed. 1940).

47 Id. at §§ 1402-10.
48 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904).
49 156 U.S. 237, 242-3 (1895).
50 APPLETON, EVIDENCE 220 (1860), quoted in 5 WsoMoaE, EvIDENcE § 1395 (3d ed.
1940).
51 State v. Heffernan, 24 S.D. 1, 123 N.W. 87 (1909). 5 WIGMORE, EVmENcp § 1397
(3d ed. 1940).
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is a result tangentially associated with the process of confrontation whose original
and fundamental object was to permit the opponent's cross-examination. If the
evidence of the witness was taken in the defendant's presence and there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination, it has been held that the defendant has
had all the protection which the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were intended
of the right to cross-examination disposes of
to secure for him. 52 This satisfaction
53
any so-called right of confrontation.
Critique. - The amendment attempts to protect the defendant by giving
him the right to face the witness and to cross-examine him. Provision is even
made for paying for the expense of travel and subsistence of the defendant and
his counsel for the attendance at the examination; but, arguably, there is still an
abrogation of a right of the defendant insofar as "demeanor evidence" is excluded.
The question arises whether this so-called "secondary feature" is merely a
dramatic garnishment, a preliminary measure appurtenant to cross-examination.
There are many nuances aside from the literal import of the testimony, which are
impossible to record. 54 It is submitted that there is an invaluable right to this elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment while testifying which
weighs heavily upon the decision of the judge and the jury. Can a defendant
damned by the words of an invisible accuser be said to have been given a fair
trial under the Sixth Amendment?
III.
Background. -

PRE-TRAL PROCEDURE:

RULE 17A

Proposed Rule 17A would establish a basis for pre-trial con-

ferences in criminal cases. 55 Upon the motion of either party or upon its own
motion, the court may order the parties to appear before it to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. There are provisions made for
protecting some of the defendant's rights: No admission of guilt shall bind the
defendant or be admissible in evidence, and the rule shall not be invoked in the
case of a defendant not represented by counsel. The fundamental powers of the
court are somewhat enlarged by the rule but the real purpose is to foster the utilization of such procedures.
5
In Missouri and New Jersey there are court rules for pre-trial procedure '
and even in the absence of a rule, pre-trial conferences have been utilized in both
58
federal and state courts.5" The pre-trial rule proposed in both preliminary drafts
encountered considerable resistance. Some prosecuting attorneys took the position
that such a rule would encourage "fishing expeditions" by the defendants while
other members of the bar feared that such a rule might operate as a judicial device
59
of subtle intimidation for eliciting confessions and stipulations from the defendant.
In face of such opposition the proposal was deleted from the adopted Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure. Proposed Rule 17A differs substantially from the
52 People v. Fish, 125 N.Y. 136, 26 N.E. 319 (1891).
53 5 WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 1396 (3d ed. 1940).
54 See Ryland's dissent in State v. McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, (1857).
55 Proposed Rule 17A reads as follows:
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information the court
upon motion of either party or upon its own motion may order the parties
to appear before 'it for one or more conferences to consider such matters
as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. No admission of guilt at the
conference shall bind the defendant or be admissible in evidence. This rule
shall not be invoked in the case of a defendant who is not represented by
counsel.
1962 Proposed Amendments 11.
56 MO. SUP. CT. RULE 25.09; N.J. RULES, 3:5-3.
57 See Kaufnian, The Apalachin Trial: Further Observations on Pre-Trial In Criminal
Case, 44 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 53 (1960).
58 FED. R. CRiu. P., Preliminary Draft 86-88 (1943); FED. R. CRIM. P., Second Preliminary Draft 78-80 (1944).
59 Kaufman, Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases, 42 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 150 (1959).
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earlier proposals. It is of wider scope because it is not limited by a listing of the
general areas open to pre-trial procedure; it may also be initiated by either counsel
instead of only by the court. But most significantly, the pre-trial procedure is
initiated by a court order rather than by a judicial invitation.
Purpose of the Rule. -

Fundamental principles of pre-trial procedure seem

to be applicable to criminal as well as civil cases. Patterned on the civil pre-trial
procedure rule, this proposed rule establishes legal machinery for simplifying,
shortening, and possibly avoiding, a trial. It is hoped that pre-trial procedure
will: 1) reduce the number of witnesses who must be called for the purpose of
verifying records; 2) eliminate the necessity of the time-consuming process of detailed examination by opposing counsel in the courtroom of documents which he
has not previously seen; 3) avoid the delay of recording and numbering exhibits
during the course of the trial; 4) eliminate the delay and confusion in the examination of witnesses (since each attorney will have an index of exhibits bearing pre-assigned numbers, and therefore can quickly locate the particular exhibit
needed in the examination of witnesses) ; 5) obviate the necessity of discovery motions, or at least reduce the number of such motions and, in general; 6) save time
and money while making the job of the trial judges and attorneys easier and more
conducive to the promotion of justice. 60 Although the rule's object is not to solicit
pleas, the defendant's realization of the strength of the prosecution's case may induce
a plea of guilty and eliminate the trial. The benefit of all this elimination and
simplification is that there is lesser likelihood of burial of relevant material in a
morass of evidence.
The value of pre-trial procedure may be most readily seen by looking at
particular cases where it has been successfully used. One illustration 1 of this
occurred when the government proposed to introduce eighteen thousand documentary exhibits. At the suggestion of the court the government pre-numbered
all the exhibits and made them available to opposing counsel substantially in advance of trial. Upon appraisal of such overwhelming evidence, defense counsel
who previously believed the government would not be able to prove its case, conferred with his clients with a resulting plea of guilty. The ultimate result was the
saving by the government of between fifty and one hundred thousand dollars and
four to six months of court time. A collateral benefit from the expeditious use of
court time was the insuring of the right to speedy trial to other litigants. 6 2 Even the
defense counsel was enthusiastic about the use of pre-trial procedure in this case. He
is quoted as saying:
I think pre-trial [proceedings] played a very substantial part in getting
the case disposed of in a proper way, without consuming several months
of time which I believe would necessarily have been consumed in an
actually contested trial. As a result of thousands of exhibits being made
available to the defense attorneys for inspection, a proper disposition of
the case was brought about, whereas it is doubtful
63 that this could have
been accomplished without pre-trial proceedings.
In a conspiracy case the number of defendants was reduced from forty-six to
nineteen after pre-trial, and such procedure as choosing one counsel as spokes-

man, and working out an apportionment of preemptory challenges reduced the

6s
trial time to one third of what it would have been.' The Apalachin trial which
would have taken a minimum of six months was completed in eight weeks due

to the expedience of pre-trial procedure. The testimony of over one hundred witnesses, usually concomitant with authentication, was preempted by the defense
not pressing its right to have such made during the trial. The government in return showed itself willing to make grand jury minutes and other statements of
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NOTES
witnesses available in advance of trial. A genuine spirit of co-operation existed
and, with66 no loss of real rights, there was an inestimable gain in speed and
efficiency.
It is certain that an informed and resourceful judge can mold available procedures and techniques to fit a particular case. By using his persuasive powers
the judge can produce a climate conducive to voluntary agreements, and eliminate
an unnecessarily bulky record, thus simplifying and expediting the handling of
67
voluminous documentary evidence and resolving numerous procedural problems.
Constitutional Problems. - There seems to be a serious question of constitutionality in the wording of Rule 17A. While the 1943-1944 proposals and the
existing state court rules are voluntary procedures, this new rule is couched in
mandatory terms. Because of guarantees afforded criminal defendants under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and the inherent pitfalls of self-incrimination
and abuse of fair trial latent in pre-trial procedure, any rule effected must be
on a voluntary basis.68 The stipulations that no admission of guilt at the conference shall bind the defendant and "the rule shall not be invoked in the case
of a defendant who is not represented by counsel," while insuring some of the
defendant's rights, do not seem to completely ameliorate the unconstitutionality
of a mandatory pre-trial rule. The securing of admissions of fact and of documents
from a defendant without placing the trial judge under suspicion, and in many
cases under direct charge of "compelling a defendant to be a witness against
himself," is an impossible task.69
Critique. - Although there is less precedent for pre-trial conference in criminal
than in civil cases, pre-trial criminal procedure has been successfully employed
in a sufficient number of cases to manifest its usefulness. Although all attempts
reported seem to have been restricted to the "big" or protracted case, there are
certainly benefits which might readily accrue to the use of such procedure in any
complicated litigation.
Since there seems to be a marked disinclination on the part of federal judges
to utilize their existing power to conduct pre-trial conference even in cases demanding such attention, any rule leaving the initiation of such procedure to the
judge, as in the 1943-1944 proposals, would render the rule innocuous. 70 Rule
17A, however allows either the prosecution, the defense, or the court to activate
the procedure. Thus, if 17A is passed even those judges who are presently hesitant
to chance possible incroachments on the rights of the defendant will be obligated
to engage in requested pre-trial conferences.
While the possibility of a weak judge catering to the whims of the prosecution turning a particular conference into an inquisition is a conceivable danger,
there does not seem to be an imminent threat of the inquisitorial practice replacing the adversary system. Pre-trial procedure actually facilitates the adversary
system by eliminating cumbersome evidentiary and procedural digressions. However,
while the values of the procedure cannot be denied, its possibilities for encroachment on the rights of the defendant are great. It is felt that such procedure must
be carefully circumscribed within fixed limits and, regardless of its advantages,
should not be forced upon an unwilling defendant. A great advantage of this procedure is the co-operation between the prosecution and the defense in the search
for truth. No such co-operation can be mandated by court order.
Richard D. Catenacci
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